In this paper we prove that perfect graphs are kernel solvable, as it was conjectured by Berge and Duchet (1983) . The converse statement, i.e. that kernel solvable graphs are perfect, was also conjectured in the same paper, and is still open. In this direction we prove that it is always possible to substitute some of the vertices of a non-perfect graph by cliques so that the resulting graph is not kernel solvable.
Introduction and Main Results
A directed graph D = (V, A) is called a super-orientation of the simple graph G = (V, E), if D is obtained from G by orienting all of its edges in an arbitrary way (for some or for all of the edges (u, v) ∈ E both arcs −→ uv and −→ vu may be included in A).
A subset S ⊆ V of the vertices of a directed graph D = (V, A) is called a kernel, if it is a stable set and every vertex outside of S has a successor in S (i.e. if no arc −→ uv∈ A has both endpoints in S, and for every u ∈ S there exists a v ∈ S such that −→ uv∈ A). Let us note that if S is a kernel of a super-orientation of G, then S is a maximal stable set of G.
Since the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 rely heavily on results of game theory, we introduce the necessary notions and results in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that core solvability of a graph G is equivalent with the stability of an associated effectivity function E G .
In Section 5 we show that perfectness of a graph G is equivalent with the gstability of the associated family K G of coalitions.
The connection between the two types of stability, shown in Section 6, enables us to prove Theorems 1 and 2. A key ingredient in our proof is a result of [16] which is relatively hard to access. Therefore, we included an independent proof for Theorem 1 in Section 7, based on a result of [11] (see also [12, 13] ).
In Section 8 we give an overview of the used notions, their relations, and summarize the main results of the paper. For the definitions see Section 3, and the beginning of Sections 2 and 4.
In Section 9 we show further properties of kernel solvable graphs, and formulate new conjectures, equivalent with Conjecture 2. Finally, in Section 10 we state a general criterion for g-stability of hypergraphs.
Sub-orientations and Core Solvability
A directed graph D = (V, A) is called a sub-orientation of the simple graph G = (V, E), if D is obtained from G by orienting some of the edges of G (for the sake of simplicity we shall assume that no edge is bidirected in a sub-orientation).
Let us note that there is an obvious one-to-one correspondence between suband super-orienta tions of a simple graph G = (V, E). In a super-orientation of G edges can be uniquely or both ways oriented, while in a sub-orientation they can be uniquely or not at all oriented. Clearly, interchanging the operations "both way orient" and "not orient at all" will establish a one-to-one correspondence between sub-and super-orientations of G. Let us now fix a sub-orientation D = (V, A) of the graph G = (V, E). We shall say that a vertex v rejects (in D) a stable set S ⊆ V if −→ uv∈ A for all edges (u, v) ∈ E for which u ∈ S. We shall call a sub-orientation D of G rejecting if every stable set of G is rejected (in D) by some vertex. (Let us note that a non-maximal stable set S is always rejected by any of the vertices v ∈ S for which S ∪ {v} is also stable.) Finally, let us call a sub-orientation of G clique acyclic if it does not contain a directed cycle inducing a clique of G.
Let us observe the following easy relations. For the converse direction let us observe that if a maximal stable set S is not a kernel in D + , then there must exist a vertex v ∈ S which has no successor in S, i.e. for which all the edges between S and v are directed uniquely toward v (there are such edges, since S is a maximal stable set). Then, all these edges appear with the same orientation in D − , too, and hence v rejects S in D − .
(ii). Let C = {v 0 , v 1 , ..., v s } be the vertex set of a directed cycle in D − inducing a clique of G. Let us say
Then, since A − ⊆ A + and no edge appearing in A − is oriented both ways in A + , none of the vertices of C is the successor of all the other, i.e. C has no kernel.
On the other hand, if D
− induces an acyclic subgraph on a clique C of G, then there exists a vertex v ∈ C which has no successor in C in D − . Such a vertex obviously is the successor of all other vertices of C in D + . 2
A simple graph G will be called core solvable if it has no clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation. It follows from the previous lemma that core solvability and kernel solvability are equivalent.
Corollary 4 A simple graph is kernel solvable if and only if it is core solvable. 2 Example 1. Let us consider odd holes and odd anti-holes. Let V = {v 0 , v 1 , . . ., v n−1 }, where n is an odd integer, let
and let
Then, G = (V, E) is an odd hole, and G = (V, E ) is an odd anti-hole. Let us define now
Then, it is easy to verify that D = (V, A) is a rejecting, clique acyclic suborientation of both G and G (see Figure 1) . E Oriented edge pppppppppp Unoriented edge Let us remark that while odd holes have a unique clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation, odd anti-holes may have several, non-isomorphic ones. As an example let us consider the sub-orientation of C 7 given in Figure 2 . This suborientation is clique acyclic, rejecting, and non-isomorphic to the one given in Figure 1 . 
Effectivity Functions and Stability
In this section we introduce definitions and recall basic results from game theory.
Let I denote the set of players and A denote the set of outcomes. Each player i ∈ I has a set of strategies denoted by X i , and let X = × i∈I X i . A game is described by two mappings, g : X → A and u : I × A → IR. The mapping g (sometimes called a game form) specifies the outcome of the game for every possible combinations of the strategies of the players. (Note that the mapping g is supposed to be surjective but not usually injective.) The real function u, called the utility (or payoff) describes the "value" of an outcome for an individual player. Player i ∈ I is said to prefer outcome a 1 ∈ A over a 2 ∈ A if u(i, a 1 ) > u(i, a 2 ). We shall call in the sequel the quadruple I, A, X, g a game form, and the quintuple I, A, X, g, u a game in normal form.
Subsets of the players are called coalitions and subsets of the outcomes are called blocks. A coalition K ⊆ I is said to be effective for a block B ⊆ A if the players of K can guarantee the outcome of the game to belong to B. This relation can be represented as a Boolean mapping E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1} called an effectivity function, i.e. E(K, B) = 1 if and only if the coalition K is effective for the block B. We shall call the quadruple I, A, E, u a game in effectivity function form. Obviously, every game form Γ = I, A, X, g defines uniquely an effectivity function, denoted by E Γ by setting E Γ (K, B) = 1 for a coalition K ⊆ I and a block B ⊆ A if and only if there are strategies y k ∈ X k for every k ∈ K such that g(x) ∈ B, for every x ∈ X for which x k = y k , k ∈ K.
Clearly, given the set of players I and the set of outcomes A any Boolean mapping E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1} can be considered as an effectivity function, but not all effectivity functions are generated by game forms. The following theorem of [25] characterizes which effectivity functions are corresponding to game forms.
Theorem 5 (Moulin and Peleg, 1982) . A Boolean mapping E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1} is the effectivity function of a game form Γ if and only if E satisfies the following conditions: An effectivity function E can also be specified by explicitly listing all pairs of coalitions K and blocks B for which K is effective for B. Conversely, given a list T = (K j , B j )|j ∈ J , where J is a finite set of indices, K j ⊆ I is a coalition and B j ⊆ A is a block for j ∈ J, let E T denote the effectivity function corresponding to T, i.e. E T (K, B) = 1 if and only if (K, B) = (K j , B j ) for some j ∈ J.
Let us call an effectivity function E playable if there exists a game form Γ for which E ≤ E Γ , i.e. for which
The following theorem of [16] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the playability of an effectivity function.
Theorem 6 (Gurvich and Vasin, 1978) . Let us consider an effectivity function E T defined by the list T = (K j , B j )|j ∈ J . Then the following properties are equivalent.
(ii) For every subset J ⊆ J for which the corresponding coalitions are pairwise disjoint (i.e., K j ∩ K j = ∅ for every j, j ∈ J , j = j ), the corresponding blocks have a nonempty intersection, i.e. ∩ j∈J B j = ∅.
Let us remark that Theorem 6 can be derived directly from Theorem 5. For completeness, we include here a short proof.
Proof. Let us assume first that E T is playable, i.e. E T ≤ E Γ for some game form Γ, and let J ⊆ J such that E T (K j , B j ) = 1 for all j ∈ J , and
The effectivity function E Γ is monotone, super-additive and satisfies the boundary conditions, according to Theorem 5. Thus, E Γ ( j∈J K j , j∈J B j ) = 1 follows by the super-additivity of E Γ . This implies then j∈J B j = ∅ since E Γ (I, ∅) = 0 and E Γ is monotone.
Let us assume next that E T satisfies (ii). Let us define E by setting E (K, B) = 1 if there exists a nonempty index-subset J ⊆ J such that K ⊇ j∈J K j , B ⊇ j∈J B j , and the corresponding coalitions are pairwise disjoint (i.e.
It is not difficult to check that the obtained effectivity function E satisfies all conditions of Theorem 5, hence there exists a game form Γ for which E = E Γ . Since E ≥ E T follows by the definition of E , we can conclude that E T is playable. 2
Let us now fix an effectivity function E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1} and a utility u : I × A → IR. We shall say that a coalition K ⊆ I can reject an outcome a ∈ A if there exists a block B ⊆ A such that E(K, B) = 1 and u(k, b) > u(k, a) for every player k ∈ K and outcome b ∈ B. In other words, K can reject a if K is effective for a block B in which every outcome is strictly and unanimously prefered to a by all players of K. Let
(
Given a family K ⊆ 2 I of coalitions, the K-core of the game I, A, E, u in effectivity function form is defined as
Given the set of players I and the set of outcomes A an effectivity function E is called stable if C(E, u, 2 I ) = ∅ for every utility function u : I × A → IR.
Given an effectivity function E, let us consider a table of triples R = (K j , B j , R j )|j ∈ J , where K j ⊆ I, B j ⊆ A, and R j ⊆ A for all j ∈ J. We shall call R a rejecting table of E, if E(K j , B j ) = 1 and R j ∩ B j = ∅ for all j ∈ J, and A = ∪ j∈J R j . The ordered subset {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j s } ⊆ J of the indices is called a common player cycle of the rejecting table
The following theorem of [18] characterizes stability of effectivity functions in terms of their rejecting tables.
Theorem 7 (Keiding, 1985) An effectivity function is stable if and only if every rejecting table of it contains a common player cycle.
Given the set of players, I, a family K ⊆ 2 I of coalitions is called g-stable if ∅ = C(E Γ , u, K) for every game Γ = I, A, X, g, u in normal form.
Let us consider a family K of coalitions, and a nonnegative integer valued weight function on it, w : K → Z Z + . The function w is called a balanced weighting of K with multiplicity σ if for every player i ∈ I the equation
holds. The subfamily K w = {K ∈ K|w(K) > 0} is called the support of w. A balanced weighting w with multiplicity σ = 1 is called a partition weighting (or simply a partition), for the support K w of such a weighting w is a partition of I. We shall say that a family K has property BSP (i.e. has the property that every balanced subfamily of K is partitionable), if every balanced weighting of K is the nonnegative integral combination of partitions. In other words, K has property BSP if and only if for every balanced weighting w : K → Z Z + there are partitions w i : K → {0, 1} and nonnegative integers The following theorem of [16] (see also [28] ) characterizes the g-stability of a family of coalitions.
Theorem 8 (Gurvich and Vasin, 1978). The family of coalitions K is g-stable if and only if K ∪ [I] has property BSP.
An effectivity function E : 2
(i.e. where D i ∩ D j = ∅ whenever i = j, i, j ∈ I), and for every balanced weighting w : K → Z Z + there exists a coalition K ∈ K w such that
Balancedness of an effectivity function is a strong property, and according to the following theorem, it is essentially a sufficient condition for its stability (see [11] [12] [13] ).
Theorem 9 (Danilov and Sotskov, 1987) . B-monotone balanced effectivity functions are stable.
We have to remark here that the above theorem was originally stated only for effectivity functions which are generated by game forms (see Theorem 5) . The proof used in [11] , however, is in fact valid for any B-monotone effectivity function, as stated above.
We also would like to point out that both theorems, 8 and 9, build heavily on a result by Scarf, [27] . For a simplified proof of Theorem 8 see [8, 9] .
Effectivity Functions of Graphs
Given a graph G = (V, E) we shall consider games in which players are maximal cliques, and outcomes are maximal stable sets. Let I G and A G denote respectively the families of maximal cliques and maximal stable sets of G. For every vertex v let K v ⊆ I G denote the family of all maximal cliques of G containing v, and let B v ⊆ A G denote the family of all maximal stable sets of G which contain vertex v. Finally, let
and let E G denote the effectivity function defined by T G .
Lemma 10
The effectivity function E G is always playable.
Proof. Indeed, the conditions of Theorem 6 are fulfilled. To see this let us consider an arbitrary subset W ⊆ V of the vertices, for which the coalitions K w , w ∈ W are pairwise disjoint. Clearly, W is a stable set of G. Let S be a maximal stable set of G which contains W . Then, S ∈ B w for all w ∈ W , by the definition of the blocks
Next we show that the core solvability of G is equivalent with the stability of E G .
Lemma 11 A simple graph G is core solvable if and only if the associated effectivity function E G is stable.
Proof. Let us assume first that E G is not stable. Then by Theorem 7 there exists a rejecting table R = (K j , B j , R j )|j ∈ J having no common player cycles. Let us observe first that E G (K, B) = 0 unless K = K v and B = B v for some v ∈ V , by the definition of E G . This implies, by the definition of rejecting tables that J ⊆ V . Since the addition of triples (K v , B v , ∅), v ∈ V \ J to R keeps R a rejecting table of E G , we may assume J = V , as well.
Let us define now an orientation A of some of the edges of G as follows: For every maximal stable set S ∈ R v , v ∈ V and for every vertex u ∈ S for which (u, v) ∈ E let us include the arc
First, we claim that D = (V, A) is clique acyclic, thus in particular no edge of G is oriented both ways in D, and hence D is a clique acyclic sub-orientation of G. Let us assume on the contrary that {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v s } is a clique cycle, i.e. 
.., s, the above together would imply that {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v s } is a common player cycle in R, a contradiction which proves the claim.
We claim next that D = (V, A) is a rejecting sub-orientation of G. This is quite immediate, since R is a rejecting table, thus, for every maximal stable set S ∈ A G there exists a vertex v for which S ∈ R v , and therefore, by the definition of the arcs in D, the set S is rejected at vertex v. Therefore, D is a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orienation of G, and thus G is not core solvable.
For the converse direction, let us assume now that G is not core solvable. This implies that there exists a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation D = (V,
We claim that this rejecting table has no common player cycles, and thus it proves that E G is not stable. To see this claim, let us assume on the contrary that {v 1 , ..., v s } forms a common player cycle, i.e. 
Perfectness and Partitionable Balanced Families
In this section we prove that perfectness of a graph G is equivalent with the gstability of the associated family K G of coalitions. The main technical result of this section, Lemma 14 is essentially equivalent with a result of [10, 14] about the integrality of the fractional vertex packing polytope. For completeness and clarity we give a simple proof below.
Let us observe first the following easy but helpful statement. Let us assume next that for every balanced weighting w : H → Z Z + of H the support H w = {H ∈ H|w(H) > 0} contains a partition P of S. Let us prove now by induction on the multiplicity of balanced weightings that every balanced weighting is the sum of partitions. Clearly, if w is a balanced weighting with multiplicity 1, then it is a partition itself. So, let us assume that we already have shown this for balanced weightings with multiplicity not more than σ − 1, and let us consider a balanced weighting w : H → Z Z + of multiplicity σ. Let us consider the weight function w defined by w (H) = w(H) − 1 if H ∈ P and w (H) = w(H) otherwise, and define another weight function w by setting w (H) = 1 if H ∈ P and w (H) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, w = w +w and w is a partition. It is also clear that w is a balanced weighting with multiplicity σ − 1. Hence, by our inductive assumption, w is the sum of partitions. Thus, w = w + w is also the sum of partitions. 2
Lemma 14 A graph G is perfect if and only if the family
Proof. Let us assume first that G is perfect. To prove that K G ∪ [I G ] has property BSP it is enough, by Lemma 13, to show that the support of every balanced weighting w contains a partition of I G . For this end, let us define W = {v ∈ V |w(K v ) > 0} and let us consider the induced subgraph G = (W, E ) of G. Let us associate the weight z v = w(K v ) to v ∈ W . Since G is perfect, it contains a stable set S ⊆ W intersecting all maximum weight cliques of G (with respect to the weights z v , v ∈ W , see [21] ). Let us note first that the balancedness of w means, by definition that there exists a constant σ > 0 such that
for every maximal cliques C of G. Let us observe now that for any maximal clique C ∈ I G of G, either the clique W ∩ C is a maximum weight clique of G (with respect to the weights z v , v ∈ W ), in which case C ∩ S = ∅, or the inequality w({C}) > 0 follows by (5) . Let us define then P = {K v |v ∈ S} ∪ {{C} ∈ [I G ]|C ∩ S = ∅}. Clearly, P is a partition of I G and it is included in the support of w.
Let us assume next that the family K G ∪ [I G ] has property BSP. To show that G is perfect it is enough to show that in any induced subgraph G = (W, E ) of G induced by W ⊆ V there is a stable set S ⊆ W which intersects all maximum cliques of G (see [21] ). To see this let us define first a weighting w of the family K G ∪ [I G ] by setting w(K v ) = 1 for v ∈ W , w(K v ) = 0 for v ∈ V \ W and w({C}) = ω(G ) − |W ∩ C| for all maximal cliques C ∈ I G , where ω(G ) is the size of the maximum clique in G . It is easy to see then that w is a balanced weighting of K G ∪ [I G ] of multiplicity ω(G ). By Lemma 13 the support of w contains a partition P of I G . Let S = {v ∈ V |K v ∈ P}. Clearly S is a stable set and S ⊆ W since w(K) > 0 must hold for every family K ∈ P. If C ∈ I G is a maximal clique for which |W ∩ C| = ω(G ), then w({C}) = 0 by the definition of w, thus C must be covered by some K v ∈ P, and hence v ∈ C ∩ S follows, showing that S intersects C. This proves that S intersects all maximum cliques of G . Since this holds for arbitrary induced subgraphs of G, it follows that G is perfect. 2
Corollary 15 A graph G is perfect if and only if K G is g-stable.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 8 and Lemma 14. 2
Let us remark that the perfectness of a graph G is also known to be equivalent with the normality of the hypergraph K G , see [22] . For the definition and further properties of normal hypergraphs see also [4] .
Corollary 16
Given a graph G, the family K G ∪ [I G ] has property BSP if and only if K G is normal.
Proof. Immediate by Lemma 14 and by Theorem 2 of [22]. 2 6 Stability and g-Stability in Graphs
We are ready now to connect the stability of E G with the g-stability of K G for a graph G.
Lemma 17 Let G be a simple graph, E G the associated effectivity function and K G the associated family of coalitions, as before. Then, if K G is g-stable, then E G is stable. Furthermore, if E G is stable for every blow up G of G, then K G is g-stable.
Proof. Let us assume first that K G is g-stable. Since E G is always playable by Lemma 10, there exists a game form Γ = I G , A G , X, g for which the corresponding effectivity function E Γ is a majorant of E G , i.e. E G ≤ E Γ . This implies by (2) that
holds for every utility function u : (2) it follows also that
Since K G is g-stable, the K G -core C(E Γ , u, K G ) of Γ is never empty. This implies by (6) and (7) that C(E G , u, 2 I G ) = ∅ for all utility functions u, and thus proves that E G is stable.
Let us assume next that K G is not g-stable. We shall show that there exists a blow up G of G for which E G is not stable.
Since now K G is not g-stable, there exists a finite game form Γ = I G , A, X, g (A = A G in general), for which the K G -core C(E Γ , u, K G ) is empty. Let us define now a new effectivity function E by setting E(K, B) = E Γ (K, B) whenever K ∈ K G , B ⊆ A and let E(K, B) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, C(E, u, 2
and therefore E is not stable. Thus, by Theorem 7, there exists a rejecting table R = (K j , B j , R j )|j ∈ J of E having no common player cycles, i.e. E(K j , B j ) = 1, B j ∩ R j = ∅ for j ∈ J, and ∪ j∈J R j = A. Since E(K, B) = 0 for K ∈ K G , all the coalitions K j , j ∈ J must belong to K G . Since the inclusion of triples (K v , A, ∅) in R is not changing the fact that R is a rejecting table of E, we may assume as well that K v = K j for at least one index j ∈ J for every vertex v ∈ V .
Let us consider now the intersection graph G = (J, E) of the family {K j |j ∈ J}, i.e. (j 1 , j 2 ) ∈ E exactly when K j 1 ∩ K j 2 = ∅. Clearly, G is a blow-up of G. Let us associate now to any maximal stable set S of G an outcome a S ∈ A as follows: The coalitions K j , j ∈ S are pairwise disjoint, because S is a stable set of G. Therefore, ∩ j∈S B j = ∅ follows by Theorem 6, since E is a playable effectivity function by its definition. Let us choose then a S ∈ ∩ j∈S B j arbitrarily. It follows from this definition that every B j (j ∈ J) contains all outcomes a S associated to maximal stable sets of G which contain j. It follows also that if a S ∈ R j for some maximal stable set S ⊆ J and vertex j ∈ J, then j ∈ S.
Let us define then an orientation D = (J, A) of the edges of G, by including all arcs −→ lj ∈ A for all l ∈ S and j ∈ J for which a S ∈ R j and (j, l) ∈ E. We shall show that D is a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation of G, which will conclude the proof of the theorem.
Exactly as in the proof of Lemma 11 we show first that any clique cycle {j 1 , ..., j s } of D corresponds to a common player cycle of R. Since R has no common player cycles, it will follow that D is clique acyclic, and in particular that its edges are not oriented both ways, thus it is a clique acyclic suborientation of G.
To see this let C be a clique cycle of G containing vertices {j 1 , ..., j s }. Then, since G is a blow-up of G, the corresponding maximal clique C of G must belong to each coalition K j l , l = 1, ..., s, thus they have a common player.
From the definition of the arcs of D it follows that, if there is an arc −→ lj ∈ A, then there exists a maximal stable set S of G for which a S ∈ R j ∩ B l . These imply that {j 1 , ..., j s } is a common player cycle of R.
Let us show finally that D is a rejecting sub-orientation of G. Again, just as in the proof of Lemma 11, this follows immediately from the definition: For any maximal stable set S of G the corresponding outcome a S is rejected by some coalitions K j , (i.e. a S ∈ R j ), since R is a rejecting table, and thus S is rejected at vertex j ∈ J of G by the definition of arcs of D.
Thus, we can conclude that the blow up G of G is not core solvable, since we could construct a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation D of it. Therefore, E G is not stable by Lemma 11. 2
Using the above lemma, we can now prove our main theorems. In this section we present an alternative proof for Theorem 1, based on Theorem 9.
Let us consider a graph G = (V, E) as before, and let us denote byÊ G the B-monotone extension of E G , i.e.Ê G (K, B) = 1 iff K = K v and B ⊇ B v for some vertex v ∈ V , or if B = A G and K = ∅.
We prove first that the balancedness ofÊ G is equivalent with the perfectness of G.
Lemma 18
The effectivity functionÊ G is balanced if and only if the graph G is perfect.
Proof. Let us assume first that G is not perfect, and let W ⊆ V be a subset of vertices for which the induced subgraph G = G| W is minimally non-perfect.
Let us define now a balanced weighting w : 2 I G → Z Z + of the coalitions as follows: let w(K v ) = 1 for all v ∈ W , let w({i}) = ω(G ) − |i ∩ W | for all maximal cliques i ∈ I G , and let w(K) = 0 for all other coalitions K ⊆ I G . Clearly, w is a balanced weighting with multiplicity σ = ω(G ).
Let us define next a partition
Since G is minimally imperfect, for every stable set S ⊆ W there exists a maximum clique C ⊆ W of G for which S ∩ C = ∅ (see e.g. [26] ). This implies that for every maximal stable set S ∈ A G there exists a maximal clique i ∈ I G , which is a maximum clique of the induced subgraph G , i.e. for which |i ∩ W | = ω(G ), and which has no common point with S in W , i.e. for which i ∩ W ∩ S = ∅. Let S ∈ D i for such a clique i ∈ I G .
We claim that with these definitionŝ
for every coalition for which w(K) > 0, implying thus thatÊ G is not balanced. To see this end, let us observe that if w(K) > 0 for a coalition then either K = K v for some vertex v ∈ W , or K = {i} for some maximal clique i ∈ I G .
In the first case, i ∩ S = ∅ for every stable set S ∈ B v and for every clique i ∈ K v , and thus by the definition of D i s we have S ∈ D i . Hence, i ∈Kv D i ⊇ B v follows, and thus (8) holds.
In the second case, w({i}) > 0 implies |i ∩ W | < ω(G ) by the definition of w, and thus D i = ∅ by the definition of the partition. Hence, j ∈{i} D i = I G and (8) follows by the definition of B-monotonicity.
Let us assume secondly that G is perfect. To show thatÊ G is balanced it is enough to prove that for any balanced weighting w and for any partition
To this end let us consider a balanced weighting w and a partition A G = i∈I G D i of the outcomes, and let us define W = {v ∈ V |w(K v ) > 0}. Since G is perfect by our assumption now, the induced subgraph G = G| W is perfect, too.
Let us observe that if there exists an i ∈ K, D i = ∅ for a coalition K for which w(K) > 0 and K = K v for any v ∈ W , then i ∈K D i = A G , and thus (9) follows for this K.
If there is no such pair
where σ denotes the common multiplicity of cliques in the balanced weighting w. In other words, D i = ∅ is possible only for cliques i ∈ I G for which i ∩ W is a maximum weight clique of G with respect to the weights w(K v ) associated to the vertices v ∈ W . Since G is perfect, there exists in this case a stable set S ⊆ W which intersects all maximum weight cliques of G (see e.g. [21] ), and thus for any maximal stable set S of G for which
, and thus (9) holds again.
Since the above could be repeated for any balanced weighting and for any partition of the outcomes, the balancedness ofÊ G follows by the definition. 2
Second proof of Theorem 1. If G is a perfect graph, thenÊ G is balanced by Lemma 18 and thusÊ G is stable by Theorem 9. Since C(Ê G , u, 2
I G ) holds for every utility functions u by (2), the stability of E G is implied, too, and thus the kernel solvability of G follows by Corollary 12. 2 Let us remark that for Theorem 1 a third, much shorter proof was found recently by R. Aharoni and R. Holzman [1] .
Summary of results
In this section we summarize the obtained results to give an overview of the various notions and their relations.
Corollary 19 Let G = (V, E) be a graph, and let us consider the following properties:
Then we have
Proof. In the first group the equivalences can be seen as follows: Property Finally the implication between the two groups follows from Lemma 17. 2
Further properties of kernel solvable graphs
Let us remark first that the notion of rejecting sub-orientation can slightly be generalized, yielding a stronger characterization of kernel solvability than Corollary 12.
Let us consider a directed graph D = (V, A), a simple graph G = (V, E), and a subset W ⊆ V . Let D| W and G| W denote the induced subgraphs of D and G, respectively, furthermore, let A| W ⊆ A and E| W ⊆ E denote the subset of arcs and edges, respectively, which have both endpoints in W . It is clear that if D is a sub-orientation of G, then for every subset W ⊆ V , D| W is a sub-orientation of G| W . Let us call a sub-orientation D = (V, A) of G = (V, E) minimal if it is rejecting, and if there is no proper subset W ⊂ V for which D| W is a rejecting sub-orientation of G| W . Let us call the sub-orientation D strongly rejecting if every stable set S of G is rejected in D by some vertex v for which S ∪ {v} is not stable.
Lemma 20 Every minimal sub-orientation is strongly rejecting.
Proof. Let D = (V, A) be a minimal sub-orientation of G = (V, E), and let us assume indirectly that S ⊆ V is a stable set which is not rejected.
Let N S denote the set of neighboring vertices of S, i.e. N S = {v ∈ V |∃u ∈ S for which (u, v) ∈ E}, and let W = V \ (S ∪ N S ).
We shall show that D| W is a rejecting sub-orientation of G| W , contradicting thus the minimality of D, and hence proving the lemma.
Since D is rejecting, S is not a maximal stable set of G, and thus W = ∅. Let P ⊆ W be any maximal stable set of G| W . Then S ∪ P is a maximal stable set of G. Since D is a rejecting sub-orientation of G, P ∪ S is rejected by some vertex u ∈ V \ (S ∪ P ).
We claim that u ∈ W . Since S is not rejected in D, for every vertex v ∈ N S there must be a neighbor w ∈ S for which −→ wv ∈ A. Therefore, none of the vertices of N S can reject S ∪ P , and hence u belongs to W . Thus, by the definition of rejection, u rejects P in D| W , too. 2
Lemma 21
If a connected graph G = (V, E) is not core solvable, then it has a strongly rejecting, clique acyclic sub-orientation.
Proof. Let D = (V, A) be a rejecting and clique acyclic sub-orientation of G.
Let us choose now a subset W ⊆ V which is minimal for the property that D| W is a rejecting sub-orientation of G| W . Then, according to Lemma 20, D| W is a strongly rejecting sub-orientation of G| W . Since, for any subset S ⊆ V the sub-orientation D| S of G| S will obviously be again clique acyclic, the suborientation D| W is also a clique acyclic sub-orientation of G| W . Thus, D| W will be both a strongly rejecting and clique acyclic sub-orientation of G| W .
Let us define now a new sub-orientation of G. Let W = {w 1 , ..., w s } and let V \ W = {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n−s } such that every vertex v j has a neighbor in W ∪ {v i |i > j}. Such a labeling of the vertices of V \ W can be obtained e.g. by putting them in decreasing order of their distances to the set W . Then, let
It is easy to check that D = (V, A) is a strongly rejecting, clique acyclic sub-orientation of G. 2
Lemmas 20 and 21 yield the following characterization of kernel solvability.
Corollary 22 A connected graph G = (V, E) is not kernel solvable if and only if it has a strongly rejecting clique acyclic sub-orientation.
. Even more, Lemma 21 implies the following property of not kernel solvable graphs.
Lemma 23
If the graph G = (V, E) contains a non kernel solvable induced subgraph, then it has a rejecting and clique acyclic sub-orientation, thus, in particular, G itself is not kernel solvable.
Proof. Let G = (W, E ) be a non kernel solvable induced connected subgraph of G, which obviously exists by the assumption. Then, by Corollary 22 there is a strongly rejecting clique acyclic sub-orientation D = (W, A) of G .
Let us repeat the construction in the proof of Lemma 21, and build a suborientation D of G itself, as follows. Let us fix a linear order of the vertices not in W , i.e. let V \ W = {v 1 , ..., v s }. Let us define then
It is quite immediate now to see that D = (V, A) is a rejecting and clique acyclic sub-orientation of G. 2
Let us remark that if G itself is connected in the above lemma, then by choosing the appropriate labeling, as in Lemma 21, one can obtain a strongly rejecting clique acyclic sub-orientation of G, too. Let us remark also that the suborientations constructed in Example 1 are actually strongly rejecting clique acyclic sub-orientations of the odd holes and anti-holes. This implies immediately the following statement.
Corollary 24
If the (connected) graph G contains an odd hole or an odd antihole, as an induced subgraph, then it has a (strongly) rejecting, clique acyclic sub-orientation, thus, in particular, G is not kernel solvable.
2
The above may suggest that clique acyclic minimal sub-orientations always induce a strongly rejecting sub-orientation of an induced odd hole or odd anti-hole. This however is not true as the example in Figure 3 shows.
Let us note that, by Lemma 17, Conjecture 2 is equivalent with the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3. Every blow up of a kernel solvable graph is kernel solvable.
Proof. Let D = (S 1 ∪· · ·∪S n , A ) be a clique acyclic, rejecting sub-orientation of G . Let us define now a sub-orientation of G as follows:
Let us remark first that D = (V, A) is obviously a clique acyclic sub-orientation of G, since every clique cycle in D would naturally correspond to a clique cycle of D .
To see that it is rejecting, let us consider a maximal stable set S of G, and let
Clearly, S is a maximal stable set of G , and thus it is rejected by a vertex x in D . It is easy now to verify that if x ∈ S j , then v j must reject S in D. 2
Using the above lemma we can show that the following, seemingly unrelated statement is also equivalent with Conjecture 2.
Conjecture 4. A graph G is kernel solvable if and only if its complement G is kernel solvable.
Proof of equivalence of Conjectures 2 and 4. Let us assume first that Conjecture 2 holds. Then, by Theorem 1 perfectness and kernel solvability are equivalent, thus Conjecture 4 follows by [21] .
Let us assume now Conjecture 4 to be true, and let us consider a non perfect graph G. Then its complement, G is also non perfect (see [21] ), and thus G has a blow up, G which is not kernel solvable, by Theorem 2. Then, by Conjecture 4 the complement G is also non kernel solvable, and hence G itself is not kernel solvable, by Lemma 25. 2
A criterion of g-stability of hypergraphs
Let us remark finally that the connection between property BSP and perfectness, i.e. Lemma 14, can also be generalized in the following way.
Given a finite set I let K = {K j |j ∈ J} be a family of subsets of I. We shall say that the family has the Helly property if for any subfamily K ⊆ K, the members of which are pairwise intersecting, all the members of K have an element in common. In other words, if for every J ⊆ J for which K j ∩ K l = ∅ whenever j, l ∈ J , we have ∩ j∈J K j = ∅. Let us denote furthermore by G K the intersection graph of K, i.e. V (G K ) = J and for j, l ∈ J we have (j, l) ∈ E(G K ) iff K j ∩ K l = ∅.
Theorem 26 Let K be a family of subsets of a finite set I. The family K ∪ [I] has property BSP if and only if K has the Helly property and the intersection graph G K is perfect. In other words, the family K is g-stable if and only if it is normal.
Proof. Let us show first that the Helly property of K is necessary for K ∪ [I] to have property BSP. For if not, let K = {K j |j ∈ J } be a minimal non Helly subfamily, i.e. for which K = {K j |j ∈ J } has the Helly property for any proper subset J ⊂ J . Then ∩ j∈J K j = ∅, and there are elements x j ∈ I, j ∈ J such that x j ∈ K l for every j, l ∈ J , l = j. Let us define now a weighting w of K ∪ [I] as follows. Let w(K j ) = 1 for j ∈ J , and let w(K j ) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let w({x}) = |J | − 1 − |{j ∈ J |K j x}|, for every x ∈ I. Then w is a balanced weighting of K ∪ [I] of multiplicity |J | − 1.
It is easy to see that the support of w does not contain a partition. For this, let us observe that w({x j }) = 0 for j ∈ J , thus any partition must contain at least one of the sets of K . Since the sets of K are pairwise intersecting, no partition can contain two or more of these sets, therefore a partition must contain exactly one, say K j for some j ∈ J . But then x j ∈ K j could not be covered by sets of the support of w. This proves that the support of the balanced weighting w does not contain a partition, and hence it follows by Lemma 13 that K ∪ [I] cannot have property BSP.
Let us associate now to every element i ∈ I a clique C(i) of G K by setting C(i) = {j ∈ J|K j i}. Let us observe next that if K has the Helly property, then the collection of cliques {C(i)|i ∈ I} contains all maximal cliques of G K .
Let us call an element i ∈ I passive if there is another element i ∈ I such that the family of sets K ∈ K containing i is a proper subfamily of those sets K ∈ K which contain i . Let us observe that the restriction of the sets of K on the set of non-passive elements yields a family K * for which K Let us observe that property BSP of the family K ∪ [I] can be shown to be equivalent with the integrality of the associated set-packing polytope, P K = {x|Ax ≤ 1}, where A is the (0, 1)-matrix, the columns of which are the characteristic vectors of the sets of K. Therefore, Theorem 26 is in fact equivalent with Theorem 2 of [22] , which characterizes normal hypergraphs.
Let us remark finally that Theorem 26 was rediscovered in game theoretic context and proved independently in [19, 20] .
